On the Analogy between Field Experiments in Economics and Clinical Trials in Medicine by Favereau, Judith
HAL Id: hal-02092631
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02092631
Submitted on 8 Apr 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
On the Analogy between Field Experiments in
Economics and Clinical Trials in Medicine
Judith Favereau
To cite this version:
Judith Favereau. On the Analogy between Field Experiments in Economics and Clinical Trials in
Medicine. Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis (Routledge), 2016. ￿hal-02092631￿
On the Analogy between Field Experiments in
Economics and Clinical Trials in Medicine
Judith Favereau
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Abstract
Randomized experiments, as developed by Esther Duflo and Abhi-
jit Banerjee at the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL),
offer a novel, evidence-based approach to fighting poverty. This ap-
proach is original in that it imports the methodology of clinical trials
for application in development economics. This paper examines the
analogy between J-PAL’s field experiments in development economics
and randomized controlled trials in medicine. Randomized controlled
trials (RCTs) and randomized field experiments (RFEs) are commonly
treated as identical, but such treatment neglects some of the major
distinguishing features that make each experiment specifically apt for
use in its respective field. The central claim of this paper is that the
analogy between medicine and development economics is incomplete
because the central dimensions of RCTs are not simply different, but
altogether lacking in J-PAL’s approach. This weakens both the po-
litical and the theoretical power of such experiments in development
economics.
Keywords: Randomized Experiments; Medical Clinical Trials;
Philosophy of Economics; Development Economics; Interdisciplinary
Transfers; Analogy
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1 Introduction
“In the 20th century, clinical trials have revolutionized medical practice.
Unfortunately, the same observation does not apply to policies concerning
education and health. Often, these policies are not subject to rigorous eval-
uation before being generalized (...) It is, however, possible to draw inspira-
tion from clinical trials to conduct evaluations of pilot programs in terms of
education and health.1” (Duflo, 2010, p. 17)
“These changes will be incremental, but they will sustain and build on them-
selves. They can be the start of a quiet revolution.” (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011,
p. 265)
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In the last decade, randomized experiments (an experimental design cen-
tered on a random assignment of treatments) have achieved notable success,
marked by a large increase in their use in economics and in diverse areas
of the social sciences. Fisher (1935, 1926) originally designed this exper-
imental procedure to test agricultural soils and fertilizers. However, this
procedure achieved major success for its application not in the field of agri-
culture, but in medicine, as a result of the “expansion” of randomized con-
trolled trials (RCTs) during the 1950s. More recently, randomized exper-
iments have proven exceptionally—and increasingly—useful to researchers
in development economics at the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab
(J-PAL). Three economists—Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil
Mullainathan— at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) founded
this laboratory with the aim of adapting an evidence-based approach to the
fight against poverty. The idea was to produce reliable data on the efficacy
of development programs and then to use these data to guide policy-makers.
From this perspective, randomized experiments appear to be the preferred
tool for producing these data because they offer strong internal validity.
In the researchers’ own words, their strategy essentially aimed “to mimic
randomized trials that are used in medicine to evaluate the effectiveness of
new drugs” (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011, p. 8) within development economics.
This impressive use of randomized field experiments (RFEs) has compelled
Angrist and Pischke (2010) to speak of an “empirical revolution.” In addi-
tion to this “empirical revolution,” which follows from the methodological
revolution that occurred in medicine2, Banerjee and Duflo (2011, p. 265)
envisage a “quiet revolution,” one which stands to substantially improve the
life of the poor.
Clinical trials in medicine and field experiments in economics are usu-
ally considered analogous. In fact, many philosophers of science (Cartwright,
2011, 2010, 2009, 2007; Reiss & Teira, 2013; Teira, 2013, 2011)3, physicians
(Rothwell, 2005), and even development economists (Deaton, 2010; Rodrik,
2009; Barett & Carter, 2010; Ravallion, 2009a, 2009b; Harrison, 2011a,
2011b) do not distinguish between these two types of experiments in their
analyses. Although RFEs and RCTs share many identical features, they also
possess a number of distinguishing ones. Examining the differences between
these two types of experiments can highlight many of the challenges faced in
both domains. This paper examines the analogy between randomized exper-
iments in medicine and development economics by exploring the similarities
and differences in the transfer of this experimental design between these two
fields. Contrary to the notion of identity, analogy4, which identifies similar-
ities and differences, allows one to scrutinize experiments made in medicine
and development economics according to their disciplinary transfers.
The central claim of this paper is that an analogy between medicine and
development economics is ultimately incomplete because the central dimen-
sions of RCTs are not simply different from those of RFEs, but lacking alto-
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gether. This lack, therefore, weakens both the political and the explanatory
powers of RFEs in development economics. Indeed, although RCTs have
worked reasonably well in medicine, they faced serious objections regarding
their ability to measure the safety and efficacy of treatments.5 Compared to
RCTs, RFEs seem incomplete from two standpoints: elements are missing
from the experimental design and their outcome is interpreted in a markedly
different context. Consequently, objections to RCTs in medicine appear
more serious in economics. To demonstrate this, the first section presents
the common features of randomized experiments in medicine and develop-
ment economics by mapping their one-to-one correspondences, as Gentner
(1983) suggests. Doing so allows one to define precisely what these experi-
ments are, thus breaking with any confusing definitions of this methodology.
The second section illustrates the distinguishing features of these two uses of
randomized experiments by mapping their one-to-one incongruities and re-
turning to the domain in which these experiments are embedded. This study
shows that RCTs are just the third stage in a long, four-phase research pro-
cess, while RFEs in development economics are self-standing experiments. I
contend that the three phases in RCTs that are missing in RFEs contribute
crucial background and confirmatory knowledge that a proper assessment
of the effects of a social intervention cannot dispense. I examine the im-
plications of this incompleteness for research in development economics and
show that although J-PAL’s approach clearly contributes to an “empirical
revolution,” the approach must still complete the analogy by explicitly for-
mulating prior theoretical frames in order to provide both the explanatory
and political insights that would finally lead to a complete revolution.
2 Analogy: Mapping Clinical Trials in Medicine
and Field Experiments in Development Economics
For at least two centuries,6 researchers have introduced random allocations
into experimental designs and statistical estimations. The addition of a
random dimension presumably guarantees reliable assessments. However,
introducing a random dimension is insufficient to define precisely what ran-
domized controlled trials or randomized experiments entail. This section
underscores the need to map the analogy between RCTs and RFEs in order
to clarify the similarities and differences between how each field employs the
experimental design. Identifying the features common to both RCTs and
RFEs relates to the first step in the use of analogical reasoning. For that
reason, I first present two case studies: a clinical trial in the field of medicine
and a randomized experiment in development economics (2.1.). I then use
these two experiments to map their common features (2.2.), which will serve
as the core of a definition of a randomized experiment.
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2.1 Rosuvastatin and Cardiovascular Events versus Pratham
and Primary Education
The “Justification for the Use of statins in Prevention: an Intervention
Trial Evaluating Rosuvastatins” (JUPITER) (Ridker et al., 2008) is an
emblematic clinical trial in medicine. The JUPITER trial is highly represen-
tative in that it includes the essential methodological and practical elements
of a medical trial. The objective of this trial was to determine whether the
administration of 20 mg of rosuvastatin daily would prevent major cardio-
vascular events, the leading cause of death in the United States (Heron et
al., 2009). Such events correlate positively with a high level of low-density
lipoprotein (LDL) cholesterol.7 To prevent cardiovascular events, current
treatments recommend statins8 for individuals with high levels of LDL .
However, Ridker et al. (2008) maintain that many cardiovascular events
(e.g., strokes or myocardional infarctions) occur among apparently healthy
men and women with stable levels of LDL cholesterol. In addition to high
levels of LDL, the presence of high-sensitivity C-reactive protein (CRP) is
a biomarker of future cardiovascular events (Ridker, Cushman, Stampfer,
Tracy & Hennekens 1997; Ballantyne et al., 2004). Statins can also lower
CRP levels (Ridker, Rifai, Pfeffer, Sacks & Braunwald, 1999; Albert, Daniel-
son, Rifai & Ridker, 2001). Thus, Ridker et al. (2008) hypothesize that
treating seemingly healthy individuals, men and women with “levels of LDL
cholesterol below the current treatment thresholds but with elevated levels
of high-sensitivity C-reactive protein” (Ridker et al., 2008, p. 2196) with 20
mg of rosuvastatin daily will protect them from cardiovascular events. The
JUPITER trial tests this hypothesis by producing data about the benefits
of rosuvastatins in healthy individuals. The trial’s sample comprised 17 802
men (aged 50 years or older) and women (aged 60 years or older). Half of
the sample was assigned to the treatment group, which received 20 mg of
rosuvastatin daily, and the other half to the control group, which received
a placebo daily. The trial was implemented at 1,315 sites in 26 countries.
The first patient entered the trial in February 2003, and the last in Decem-
ber 2006; the trial ended in March 2008. The clinical endpoint (the target
outcome of the trial) was the occurrence of a cardiovascular event. The
trial had 520 confirmed endpoints: 142 cardiovascular events in the treat-
ment group, and 251 events in the control group. Previous clinical trials
of statins other than rosuvastatin—which included patients with high levels
of LDL cholesterol—showed a 20% decrease in vascular risk, whereas rosu-
vastatin in the JUPITER trial reduced this risk by as much as 25%. As a
consequence, the trial concluded that rosuvastatin prevents cardiovascular
events and even other causes of death:
In this randomized trial of apparently healthy men and women
with elevated levels of high-sensitivity C-reactive protein, rosu-
vastatin significantly reduced the incidence of major cardiovas-
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cular events, despite the fact that nearly all study participants
had lipid levels at baseline that were well below the threshold for
treatment according to current prevention guidelines. Rosuvas-
tatin also significantly reduced the incidence of death from any
cause. (Ridker et al., 2008, p. 2202)
Now, let me briefly describe the randomized experiment conducted in
development economics before proceeding to analogically map the features
(similarities and differences) of the two experiments. Abhijit Banerjee,
Shawn Cole, Esther Duflo, and Leigh Linden conducted this experiment
in India from 2001 to 2004 in collaboration with the NGO Pratham9 (see,
Banerjee et al., 2007; and J-PAL, Policy Briefcase, 2006). The program,
titled Balsakhi and developed by Pratham, aimed to hire young women who
had already finished secondary school to work with children who had not
yet learned to read or write. As in the medical experiment, this particu-
lar experiment was not randomly selected. I chose this RFE for a number
of reasons: first, Pratham is the largest NGO to collaborate with J-PAL
since the latter’s creation in 2003; second, educational programs are among
J-PAL’s main concerns and represent a major issue affecting many Indian
cities, thus providing a large field for these experiments. Lastly, two of J-
PAL’s leaders, Banerjee and Duflo, initiated this experiment, thus making it
significantly representative of J-PAL’s approach. In this experiment, young
women were hired to work with 15 or 20 students for two hours each week.
This program had already been implemented in Mumbai in 1998 and was
later implemented in Vadodara in 1999. In the first stage (from 2001 to
2002), the experimenters aimed to evaluate the impact of the Balsakhi pro-
gram in Vadadora. Of the 122 schools in this city, 58 participated in the
experiment; these 58 schools were then divided into two groups: group A
(students in degree three10) and group B (students in degree four). Two
groups were randomly selected from group A: one would serve as the treat-
ment group, and the other as the control group. The same random assign-
ments were carried out for group B. In the second stage, from 2002 to 2003,
the assignments were reversed: students from group A who had not received
the benefits of the Balsakhi program now did receive benefits, while those
who previously received benefits no longer did; the same inversion was car-
ried out for group B. The following year, from 2003 to 2004, none of the
groups enjoyed the benefits of the program. The results of the experiment
were considered highly positive:
The Balsakhi program appears to be successful: in all years,
for both subjects, and in both cities, and for all subgroups, the
difference in post-test scores between treatment and comparison
groups is positive and, in most instances significant. (Banerjee
et al., 2007, p. 10)
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2.2 Mapping the One-to-One Correspondences: Toward a
Precise Definition of Randomized Experiment
What do these two experiments share in common? To provide a rough an-
swer, one might first consider that both involve randomized allocations of
treatments. What does it mean for an experiment to involve a random-
ized allocation of treatment? Mapping all the one-to-one correspondences
produces the following table (see Table 1).
Both experiments aim to (1) compare two states—one which includes the
treatment (or the program) and one which does not—in order to identify
a proper causal effect of the treatment. In the case of the JUPITER trial,
the goal is to compare receiving 20 mg of rosuvastatin daily with receiving
a placebo in order to determine the usefulness of rosuvastatin in preventing
cardiovascular events; in the case of Banerjee et al. (2007), the goal is to
compare the presence of the Balsakhi program with its absence in order to
determine the program’s benefits on the writing and reading skills of the
children involved. One can determine a proper causal effect by (2) randomly
assigning the treatment. The random assignment is defined by (3) the cre-
ation of at least two groups. These two dimensions define the randomized
part of the experiment and are considered by Fisher to be the “essential
safeguard” (Fisher, 1935, p. 19) for obtaining reliable statistical results. In
addition, both experiments have been (4) replicated; the JUPITER trial was
the first to assess the impact of rosuvastatins on the prevention of cardiovas-
cular events. Since this first attempt, many trials, such as the AURORA,
the ASTROMER, the METEOR or the ASTEROID trials, have assessed
the effects of rosuvastatins on cardiovascular events.11 The RFE in Vado-
dara is itself a replication, since the Balsakhi program was first assessed
in Mumbai. Both experiments share (5) orthogonality, because both are
characterized by random assignment. Furthermore, since both experiments
aimed to test only one effect (rosuvastatin and the Balsakhi program, re-
spectively), (6) no factorial plan was necessary. According to Fisher (1935,
1926), these six characteristics allow us to define the first element of a ran-
domized experiment: its experimental design.12 Both experiments share this
experimental design.
For Fisher (1935, 1926), the crucial aspect of this specific experimental
design is the statistical rigour that it offers, especially over other experimen-
tal designs. To obtain a reliable statistical result, we commonly refer to three
kinds of statistical biases: selection bias, attrition bias, and monitoring bias.
The first kind of bias, selection bias, exists when the difference between the
two groups is linked not only to the treatment, but also to other factors
apart from the program or the treatment.13 Randomized (1) and controlled
(2) dimensions allow us to remove this bias.14 Thus, both experiments are
controlled and randomized. Both experiments are also (3) multicentric, in
that both implemented in different places at the same time: the JUPITER
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trial was implemented at 1,315 sites, and to guarantee the validity of the re-
sults, the Balsakhi program was also implemented in Mumbai in 2001-2002
and in 2002-2003. The experiment is designed (4) with the intention to treat,
that is to say the evaluation will take into account the effects the treatment
had on patients who left the experiment, which indeed occurred in both
of these experiments. Finally, to avoid a monitoring bias—an experiment
can be (5) blind to both the experimenters and the participants, so as not
to influence any party—only the JUPITER trial was double-blind (blind to
both parties); the participants of the Balsakhi program, in contrast, knew
of its goal, so it was not blind to any party.15
Both of these aspects, the experimental design and the statistical rigour,
define a randomized experiment. Once we have mapped the analogy, we
can grasp more precisely the similarities between the experimental design
of the trials in both fields. A randomized experiment is a specific design
characterized by random assignment into at least two groups, a process
serving as a guarantee for reliable statistical results.
3 Mapping Dissimilarities between RCTs and RFEs:
Toward an Incomplete Analogy
Put simply, medicine is concerned with sick people, and development eco-
nomics, with poor people, so the domains in which RCTs and RFEs are
embedded differ. RCTs are embedded in the therapeutic process, which
aims to test a medication. RFEs in development economics do not branch
from this two-fold process (therapeutic and clinical); in fact, they leave this
two-fold process out altogether, thus rendering the analogy with medicine
incomplete. The aim in this section is to define and demonstrate this analog-
ical incompleteness. To do so, I will first map the one-to-one incongruities
within the two trials, showing that RCTs and RFEs focus on different ef-
fects: RCTs focus on potential side effects, whereas RFEs aim to draw out
different effects from the experimental results in order to learn and collect
knowledge from the experiment (3.1.). This main incongruity could be at-
tributed to the fact that a RCT is the last test in a long, two-fold process
that requires the accumulation of a lot of background knowledge before the
clinical-trial stage can begin. I will then map the one-to-one incongruities
from outside the trial, by showing that this two-fold process is clearly ab-
sent from the RFEs, resulting in said incompleteness, which explains why
J-PAL’s researchers attempted to gather the background knowledge missing
from the experiment (3.2.).
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3.1 Inside the Trial: Plan of Experiments and Statistical
Background
A randomized experiment is a set of scripts. Here, I attempt to describe
these scripts in both medicine and economics in order to map the incon-
gruities (see Table 2) of the two methodologies. Doing so will not only
identify precisely what is at stake methodologically in both experiments,
but also determine what both experiments aim to produce.
Both experiments had to define their experimental samples16 depending
on precisely what the experiment sought to test, the target sample could
change. In medicine, such a sample is defined through a study population
with explicit exclusion and inclusion criteria. In the JUPITER trial, the
target population, as described above, comprised men aged 50 years and
older and women aged 60 years and older17 with no history of cardiovas-
cular events, a level of LDL cholesterol below 130 mg, a high-sensitivity
C-reactive protein level above 2.0 mg, and a triglyceride level below 500 mg.
The level of LDL cholesterol, as defined for the sample, is considered “nor-
mal,” whereas the level of high-sensitivity C-reactive protein is considered
below the “normal” threshold, respecting in that sense the hypothesis of the
trial. To join the trial, participants had to commit to the entire trial by
providing their written, informed consent. To identify this willingness and
to estimate participant compliance, all participants went through a run-in
phase in which they all received the placebo. The exclusion criteria were
quite specific18 in order to avoid interaction effects and to guarantee the
completion of the study.
In the Balsakhi program in development economics, the sample included
58 of the 122 schools in Vadodara city and comprised only children in degrees
3 and 4. The sample was then stratified by language, exam score, and gender.
As seen in the previous section, this experiment aimed to assess the basic
reading and writing skills of trial participants who should have just acquired
an elementary ability to read and write. Including children in degrees 3 and 4
in the sample allowed the researchers to evaluate the effects of participation
in the program for one and two years, respectively. No exclusion criteria
were defined, and the experimental frame made no references to informed
consent or willingness to participate. Thus, the target sample in medicine
is much clearer and more explicit, thereby preventing interaction effects,
while defining such a sample in economics seems to be much more flexible.
In addition to these specificities, a statistical baseline, as well as clinical
endpoints, was set for the participants in the medical trial. However, neither
of these two aspects appeared in the field trial in economics, which weakens
the analogy between the two methodologies: if one is not explicit enough
about the eligibility criteria of the target population, how can one generalize
the outcome?
Both experiments enabled measurement of the different effects of the
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educational program and the treatment; these measures are also useful in
mapping the incongruities between these two trials. RCT test both (1) the
safety and (2) the efficacy of the treatment, whereas RFEs do not take safety
into account. In order to meet the regulatory standards and to guarantee
the safety of the trial participants, RCT commonly assess compliance ef-
fects, side effects, and the occurrence of adverse events during the trials.
Compliance effects describe how closely participants follow the instructions
of a trial (e.g., taking the pills in the JUPITER trial). Ridker et al. (2008)
report that participants did indeed follow instructions carefully during the
trial, which compared LDL cholesterol levels in the two groups; however, the
researchers note that compliance decreased after the trial. In development
economics, the researchers seldom account for such effects. One obvious
reason could be that the program being tested is usually already visible; the
only factor researchers might need to control for or monitor whether the field
partners faithfully implement the program.19 Furthermore, RCT list all of
the adverse events occurring during the trials that could lead to potential
drug-induced side effects. In the rosuvastatin trial, the adverse events ob-
served in the treatment and control groups were similar; however, after the
trial, more patients from the treatment group than from the control group
reported diabetes to their physicians. Further trials have been conducted
to determine whether diabetes was a side effect of rosuvastatin treatment.
Because such studies do not exist in development economics experiment the
interaction between different causal factors is not assessed in a comparable
manner.
The experiment assessing the Balsakhi program distinguishes between
several effects: short-term and long-term effects, distributional effects, and
direct and indirect effects. In the-short term, as seen above, the Balsakhi
program seems effective. In this case, the researchers assess such effects by
comparing the exam scores of children before and after implementation of
the program. The likelihood of these effects persisting after the experiment
is over is low. To determine whether the observed short-term effects would
persist in the long run, researchers compared the effects of exposure to the
program over one versus two years, explaining that if the effects lasted two
years, then they could be considered durable and cumulative (Banerjee et
al., 2007, p. 1255). Researchers found that, in the long run, the positive
effects disappeared; on average short-term effects became insignificant. The
Balsakhi program targeted children with lower exam scores in order to im-
prove their basic reading and writing skills; however, researchers found that
it might also be interesting to determine whether the program benefited all
the children who participated in it and whether participation in the program
harmed the children at the top of the class. Therefore, the researchers looked
at the distributional effects among three sub-populations:20 (1) the children
with the highest exam scores, (2) the children with average exam scores,
and (3) the children with the lowest exam scores. They conclude that the
9
program most benefited the children with the lowest exam scores. Finally,
Banerjee et al. (2007) aim to open the box of their results by looking at the
direct and indirect effects of the program, since in such an evaluation, two
effects can conflate with each other: the program can affect children bene-
fiting from the program as well as children not benefiting from it. In other
words, the goal is to determine whether such a program might have spillover
effects. For that purpose, Banerjee et al. (2007) use both an instrumental
variable analysis and a discontinuity one. They claim that the effects of the
Balsakhi program concerned mainly children who directly benefited from
it; nonetheless, they affirm that they cannot reject the hypothesis that this
program may have affected children who did not directly benefit from it.
Consequently, RCTs and RFEs focus on different types of effects. The
medical trial tends to concentrate on (1) the safety of the treatment (the
harms that a medication can cause by precisely demonstrating the adverse
events that occur during trials as well as potential side effects) and (2)
the efficacy of the treatment (the validity of the trial’s results). RFEs,
however, focus only on the efficacy of the program. They aim to distinguish
between conflated effects. In this sense, because development programs often
generate spillover effects, researchers tend to separate direct and indirect
effects. Furthermore, researchers spell out the results of the experiments
with further statistical analyses, such as specifying the distribution of the
treatment for certain specific sub-populations. In this sense, because RFEs
have less control over the participants eligibility, the number of unnoticed
events is more likely to be higher than in medicine, which threatens the
validity of the RFEs results.
3.2 Thinking Outside the Trial: the Therapeutic Phases
The fact that a RCT concerns only phase III of a therapeutic trial may ex-
plain the substantial methodological differences that arise from using similar
experiments for significantly different purposes. I will therefore go beyond
the analogy between the two experimental designs and attempt to explore
the disanalogy between the context in which RFEs and RCTs produce their
results. In medicine, a therapeutic trial consists of five phases: the pre-
clinical phase, phase I, phase II, phase III, and phase IV (Bouvenot & Vray,
2006). Phase III (the RCT) is the last test carried out in the development of
a new drug. Before reaching phase III, however, knowledge about the drug’s
effects and mechanisms will have already been gathered. In medicine, the
preclinical phase aims to determine the principle effect of a treatment, often
by running tests on animals. Beginning in the 1980s (prior to the JUPITER
trial) several RCTs of other statins assessed their effects on the primary
and secondary prevention of heart disease (for a review, see Greene (2007)
and Brugts et al., 2009). Some experiments involved animals to properly
determine the effects of rosuvastatin (for a review, see Olsson, MacTagart,
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and Raza, 2002) and to define the preclinical phase of rosuvastatin. Phase
I entails the first administration of a treatment in a healthy human being
and aims to identify the conditions of the patients tolerance beings. Pre-
vious studies on healthy volunteers have aimed to determine whether the
effects of rosuvastatin in humans are comparable to those observed during
animal testing (Martin, Mitchell & Schneck, 2002). The goal of phase II is
to define the conditions under which a treatment is effective as well as the
optimal dosage. Phase II involves a group of healthy volunteers. Studies
have also determined the optimal dosage of rosuvastatins in healthy indi-
viduals (Olsson, Pears, McKellar, Mizan & Raza, 2001). Phase III studies
the efficacy of the treatment in sick people and consists of a RCT (consider
here the JUPITER trial). The last phase, phase IV, aims to define the long-
term effects of a treatment. Researchers monitored rosuvastatin treatment
to identify some of its potential side effects, such as diabetes, as tested in
the METEOR, CORONA21, and AURORA trials. The Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA)22 finally approved rosuvastatin in 2003, and a steering
committee accepted the JUPITER trial’s recommendations, leading to the
end of the trial in March 2008. Rosuvastatin, branded Crestor, is now the
third top-selling drug in the United-States.
In this context, a RCT is just one piece of a larger trial,23 and this larger
trial has a specific goal: to determine the effectiveness of a new medication
to treat a specific disease. The therapeutic process follows the clinical pro-
cess. The latter helps to diagnose and then define a remedy, whereas the
former is concerned only with the remedy. The RCT aims to reliably de-
termine the effects of the remedy, and the last phase assesses the efficacy
of this treatment in daily life outside the experimental design. We com-
monly distinguish efficacy from effectiveness (Cartwright, 2009; Rothwell,
2005; El-Serag, 2007). The notion of efficacy concerns the effects of a treat-
ment within the experimental design (i.e., within the RCT).The notion of
effectiveness concerns the effects of the treatment outside the experiment,
which involves generalizing and translating these effects into another con-
text. In other words, efficacy and effectiveness translate to the common
distinction between internal and external validity.24 If we wish to increase
the effectiveness of a treatment or its external validity, one must first pur-
sue some qualitative inquiries.25 In sum, a lot of background knowledge is
accumulated before reaching the third phase of a therapeutic trial (Teira,
2011, 2013; Reiss & Teira 2013); data gathered after the trial serve to deter-
mine the long-term effects of a treatment. Phase IV tests the effectiveness
of the treatment. In medicine, phase III is fallible, but its conclusions are
supported by previous and subsequent studies.
As Table 3 shows, J-PAL’s approach borrows from medicine only its
third phase and not the four other phases of a therapeutic trial. Thus,
in Banerjee et al.’s experiments, the researchers begin with no explicit hy-
pothesis, but with an empirical fact, namely a wide-ranging study of child
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literacy in India (see: Pratham, 2005). This study provided evidence that
many Indian students in degree three had not yet acquired the basic read-
ing and writing skills that they should have acquired in degrees one and
two. Many students simply were not learning to read and write at school.
Balancing this empirical fact with one of the Millennium Goals26 (making
primary school universal), researchers showed that increasing the number
of children at school risked undermining what children learn at school. The
objective of the experiment was quite clear: to test the impact of one possi-
ble way to increase learning among children, and the researchers cited only
a few references: the Millennium Goals (UN, 2000), the World Bank report
(2004), and Hanushek (1995, 1986)—two empirical works on schooling and
its “quality” (regardless of whether children learn at school). These works
do not serve to explain the results of Banerjee et al.’s experiment, however,
and none of these works deals with the impact of hiring young women to im-
prove learning at school. It seems that the experiment begins with a puzzle
(children are not learning at school) and then shows that the Balshaki pro-
gram is cost effective, since it is really inexpensive and increases students’
exam scores (during the experiment, at least). J-PAL’s researchers began
with an unexplained (and empirically grounded) puzzle and aimed not first
to theoretically explain it, but rather to solve the problem it represents. In
this sense, by importing only phase III of the therapeutic trial and ignoring
the other phases, which entail accumulated background knowledge, J-PAL’s
RFEs simply bring to development economics the last test phase of a medical
trial. Thus, RFEs not only share incongruities, but miss out on the advan-
tages which these rigorous, fundamental phases of RCTs provide. RFEs
in development economics have a weaker grasp of the causal knowledge at
play than do RCTs in medicine. Because RFEs do not test to determine an
adequate dosage, the conclusions one should draw from previous outcomes
in development economics, as well as what counts as replication, remain
unclear. As a result of these incongruities, any analogy between these two
methodologies is incomplete. This incompleteness explains some of the dif-
ferences between RCTs and RFEs: namely that neither experiment focuses
on the same effects. J-PAL’s researchers focus on effects that allow them to
unpack and spell out their experimental results in order to draw from the
experiment only the knowledge they are missing.
4 Implications of the Incomplete Analogy: Theo-
retical Frames and Political Recommendations
According to J-PAL’s researchers, the best way to solve empirical puzzles is
through randomized experiments. But can randomized experiments alone
succeed at such a daunting task, especially with an issue as complex as
poverty, where many often interrelated causal factors are at play? The in-
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completeness of the analogy raises two main issues: a theoretical and a
political one. This section shows that by refusing to formulate and drive
the experiments on any explicit a priori theoretical frames, J-PAL’s RFEs
struggle to produce both univocal explanations of their results and clear
political recommendations. I will show that this struggle is the main impli-
cation of the incomplete analogy. For that purpose, I will first show that,
contrary to the main criticisms of J-PAL’s approach, this approach is not
a-theoretical, but rather provides two statuses to the theory: (1) the refusal
of any prior theories driving the experiments and (2) the desire to build a
unified theory from the experimental results. However, creating this unified
theoretical framework appears difficult without first establishing clear the-
oretical guidance (4.1.). I will show that the incompleteness of the analogy
with RCTs carries not only implications for a future theoretical framework,
but important political implications for the fight against poverty also. With-
out accumulating background knowledge beforehand, drawing clear policy
recommendations from the results of the RFEs will likely be difficult (4.2.).
These two implications tend to undermine the “quiet revolution” to which
Banerjee and Duflo aspire.
4.1 Toward an Explicit Formulation of an Ex-ante Theory
Development programs are evaluated in order to determine what works (i.e.,
what is effective) in combating poverty.27 The trial enabled J-PAL’s re-
searchers to put aside any a priori assumptions and explain why they fo-
cused only on phase III and not the others, thereby rendering their approach
“neutral;” in this sense, the researchers focused their knowledge-gathering
efforts on experimentation. Thus, the epistemology underlining RFEs in
development economics is explicitly empiricist. The epistemic stance of J-
PALs researchers can be defined as follows: one should gather first evidence
in the field and then build a theoretical frame based on this evidence. Such
an epistemic stance implies that RFEs work in isolation, which threatens
the construction of a theoretical frame.
By assessing an intervention, the experiment would create the theory.
Banerjee (2005) explains that this approach entails two phases: in the first,
the experiment should produce the theory, and in the second, a theoretical
framework of “new development economics” should emerge from the experi-
mental results. Thus, both development economics and development policies
are based on evidence. To emphasize this point, Banerjee (2005) claims that
the theoretical advances in behavioral economics are based on contradictory
frames, which lead to theoretical confusion. Thus, for Banerjee (2005) the
experiment should not be driven on such a theoretical frame, as it shows
no clear direction; rather, one should assess specific programs in order to
determine what is most effective in the fight against poverty and then build
on these insights. In the same vein, Duflo (2006a, 2006b, 2010) and Banerjee
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and Duflo (2009, 2011) show that prior and explicit theoretical insights are
usually misleading and unhelpful:
What this research was making clear is that, at the level of the
efficacy of individual ingredients of the educational production
function, our intuition (or economic theory per se) was unlikely
to be very helpful—how could we possibly know, a priori, that de-
worming is so much more effective than hiring a teacher. (Baner-
jee & Duflo, 2009, p. 153)
Many critiques (Deaton, 2010; Rodrik, 2009; Leamer, 2010, Harrison,
2011a; Ravallion, 2009b; Barett and Carter, 2010) of RFEs in development
economics have pointed out the a-theoretical nature of J-PAL’s approach.
However, the epistemic stance of the theory surrounding J-PAL’s approach
seems more complex than a simple refusal. To re-frame it, it is necessary
to understand the theory surrounding J-PALs approach at two levels: ex-
ante and ex-post. The ex-ante theory expresses explicit prior theoretical
frames before implementing, and in a sense guiding, the experiment; the ex-
post status represents a desire to build a new theoretical framework based
on reliable results from RFEs. The Balsakhi experiment, however, has no
explicit theoretical framework, as explained above, but only empirical ref-
erences, since the aim is to begin with an empirical fact (or puzzle) and
then to theorize from it. However, no real theoretical framework develops
from this experiment; rather, some “plausible explanations” (Banerjee et
al., 2007, p. 1262) emerge. Therefore, the results on which “new devel-
opment economics” should be based resemble a “black-box test of ‘what
works”’ (Deaton, 2010, p. 451) or what does not work to reduce poverty.
To base precise guidance for both policy-makers as well as a unified theoret-
ical framework on these results seems complicated. The theoretical insights
from the Balsakhi experiment appear unclear, and lack background knowl-
edge: Why do the Balsakhi program’s effects fail to endure in the long run?
Why do all sub-populations seem to benefit from the Balsakhi program and
not only the target population (i.e., the most marginalized children)? An
ex ante theory or accumulated background knowledge before the RFE ap-
pears to be missing, but this is not the case with RCTs, where background
knowledge is accumulated prior to testing.
Without a doubt, background knowledge about the relationship between
education and development economics in the Balsakhi experiment is im-
plicit. For instance, the Balsakhi program targets basic education skills and
remedial education.28 Although Banerjee et al. (2007) never referred ex-
plicitly to that field, the background knowledge of such a field is at least
relevant to the experiment, even if it does not drive it. However, an explicit
prior theoretical framework in such a field (consider Kozeracki (2002), who
highlights seven ways to improve students’ remedial education)29 could have
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permitted the testing of an explicit hypothesis or a prior theoretical frame,
especially given that Duflo and Banerjee (2009, p. 156) raised the fact that
“experiments are emerging as a powerful tool for testing theories.” How-
ever, the absence of an explicit ex-ante theory to test weakens that power.
The wish for an ex-post theory based on results with strong internal validity
prevents researchers from starting with a prior theory because, in doing so,
they would no longer be neutral. In this sense, the only part to import from
medicine is phase III of the therapeutical trial. In this way, randomized ex-
periments in development economics work in isolation from previous efforts
to accumulate background knowledge, which tends to weaken their results,
thereby rendering them non explicit, languishing in a black-box from which
one must extract plausible explanations. Consequently, the “challenge for a
new development economics” (Banerjee, 2005, p. 4340) is to compensate for
the shortcomings of early experiments with RFEs, efforts which may help
to develop more rigorous RFEs in development economics.
4.2 From Local to Global Policy Recommendations: Toward
a “Quiet Revolution”
One of the main objectives of J-PAL is to offer guidance to policy-makers
in developing countries.30 If Banerjee and Duflo (2011) target a “quiet rev-
olution,” this policy guidance has to function on a two-fold level: locally
and globally. On the local level, evaluations of the development program
should offer clear recommendations for local policy and refer to the loca-
tion where the program has been assessed. On the global level, these policy
recommendations should more generally improve the lives of the poor. For
Banerjee and Duflo, as for the creation of an ex-post theory, such policy
guidance should emerge from the experiments and its results. Nonetheless,
on the local level, policy recommendations from the Balsakhi experiment
seem somewhat indefinite. For instance, the main policy lesson drawn from
the experiment is that “general school-quality improvements must be com-
plemented by specific strategies to improve the performance of marginalized
children” (J-PAL Policy Briefcase, 2006, p. 7). Such specific strategies are
not so straightforward. Are the researchers referring to the Balsakhi pro-
gram as a specific strategy or are they referring to others strategies? The
researchers insist on two dimensions: (1) the low cost of the Balsakhi pro-
gram and (2) the need to focus on marginalized children. By running a
cost-benefit analysis, researchers show that the Balsakhi program is cheaper
than the other five programs in education31. For instance, the Balsakhi pro-
gram costs 2.25$ per child per year for a 0.27 increase in test scores, whereas
the “Scholarship for Girls” program costs 3.53$ per child per year for a 0.53
increase in test scores. However, how one should use that cost analysis re-
mains unclear. Should Indian cities implement a cheaper program with fewer
gains or a more expensive program with larger gains? More generally, what
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policy lessons should be drawn from this research to help improve Indian
cities? The recommendation from the JUPITER trial was unequivocal (to
prevent primary cardiovascular events, one should use rosuvastatin) and led
to the end of the trial in March 2008. The univocity of the recommendation
does not imply that the JUPITER trial was free of controversy; as a matter
of fact, the JUPITER trial did face some controversies (see Andreoletti &
Teira, forthcoming; Ridker, 2009; De Lorgeril, 2010), but the accumulation
of background knowledge and the entire frame in which RCTs are embedded
undoubtedly supported the recommendation.
Concerning the global level, Banerjee and Duflo (2011) offer a strong
diatribe of what they call “political economy” represented mainly in the
work of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), who claim that institutions are key
in development and, thus, target both structural and global changes. In
contrast for Banerjee and Duflo (2011, p. xi), global approaches to fighting
poverty are only “magic bullets” with no proof of their efficacy; instead,
Banerjee and Duflo propose a change of perspective: focusing not on Insti-
tutions (with a capital “I”), but on institutions (with a lower case “i”). In
other words, the accumulation of small changes should lead to incremental
changes. By only focusing on phase III of a trial, however, the Balsakhi
evaluation agrees completely with this proposition. However, Banerjee and
Duflo fail to define the passage from local changes (institutions) that have
proven their efficacy through RFEs to more global changes (Institutions) in
the lives of the poor remains, leaving them rather vague. Thus, in addition
to the challenge embodied in the ex-post theory, there is also the challenge
of Institutional change. Banerjee, Banerji, Duflo, Glennerster and Khemani
(2010), again in partnership with Pratham, assess a vast nationwide pro-
gram known as “Read India”. This program aims to increase both basic
reading skills and collective cooperation in India. The goal of this program
is to encourage volunteers to teach children in their city how to read by
offering pedagogical training. This program was implemented in only a few
cities in India. The results, like those in the Balsakhi program, were con-
sidered very positive and very context dependent, yet no real explanation
for them was offered.32 Banerjee et al. (2010) interpret these results as an
indication that small institutional changes can be extremely powerful, thus
emphasizing the idea that a transformation of the public sector to improve
education is unnecessary:
This suggests that in settings in which the public service deliv-
ery system is entirely unresponsive to beneficiaries, identifying
innovative ways to foster and channel local action may be the
most effective way to improve the final outcomes. Pratham’s
‘Read India’ program is a particularly powerful example of such
an intervention. (Banerjee et al., 2010, p. 29)
Even though small changes, such as the “Read India” program, can have
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positive impacts, how these programs should be implemented and how one
can scale up from the local scale to a more general level remains unclear.
If Banerjee and Duflo (2011) want to achieve this “quiet revolution,” they
will have to accumulate (from the explicit formulation of prior ex-ante the-
ory) background knowledge and then complete the analogy with medicine.
Nevertheless, to do so, J-PAL has to relinquish some internal validity by
focusing on more than the experimental procedure and its statistical rigour.
In order to make sense of these results, J-PAL, in alignment with the empiri-
cal revolution that it created, must generate the missing knowledge that will
ultimately lead to a quiet revolution. One has to go from the empirical facts
to an ex-ante theory and then test it and finally build the ex-post theory
that would express clearly both local and global political recommendations.
Indeed, Jeffrey Sachs, one of the main figures in development economics,
highlights the necessity of such clinics by defining the role of a differential
approach and aiming to define a “clinical economy” (Sachs, 2005, p. 75).
Dani Rodrik (2010) also insists on the role of making a diagnosis before
offering a prescription. Both of these development economists make a clear
reference to the clinic, and both are in same sub-field as J-PAL. The desire
for neutrality also diverts J-PAL from other disciplines which have tried
to offer a qualitative view of poverty, as have many anthropological works
(Collins, Murdoch, Rutherford & Ruthven, 2009; Farmer, 2004), or even
works from the World Bank (Chambers, Narayan, Shah & Petesch, 2000),
which conducted more than 20 000 interviews with the poor in order to
understand their needs. In this sense, the field should not only be one of
experiments, but one apt for the explicit formulation of an ex-ante theory
and its test. This urges J-PAL to adopt a much more general interdisci-
plinary approach, one developed not only by borrowing one element from
medicine, but by trying to build a “new development economics” with the
help of other disciplines (and even with help from within the discipline) that
can help to provide access to the missing knowledge and then to complete
the analogy.
5 Conclusion
In contrast with the notion of identity, the notion of analogy, which recog-
nizes both similarities and differences, led me to examine the experiments
made in medicine and development economics through their disciplinary
transfers. By mapping their one-to-one correspondences, their similarities
served to define what RFEs borrow from medicine; this, in turn, enabled a
precise definition of randomized experiments. The differences between the
two domains break with the common idea that RCTs and RFEs are identi-
cal. The mapping of the one-to-one and incongruities shows that the analogy
is incomplete, since RFEs borrow only one of the empirical phases of the
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therapeutic trial. J-PAL’s approach tends mainly to describe poverty rather
than to fully explain it, let alone solve it. Although J-PAL’s experiments
may indeed constitute an “empirical revolution,” the more substantial revo-
lution promised by Banerjee and Duflo (2011, p. 265) can only be achieved
by more consistently opening the disciplinary boundaries to recent work in
both development economics and other disciplines, such as anthropology or
political science.
Notes
1Note: This is my translation from (Duflo, 2010, p. 17) ; the original quotation reads:
“Au XXéme siécle, les essais cliniques ont révolutionné la pratique de la médecine. Mal-
heureusement, il n’en est pas de même pour les politiques relatives á l’éducation et la santé.
Bien souvent, elles ne sont pas évaluées rigoureusement avant d’être généralisées. (...) Il
est cependant possible de s’inspirer des essais cliniques pour conduire des évaluations de
programmes pilotes en matiére d’éducation et de santé.
2See Marks (1997) for a history of this methodological revolution in medicine.
3Vincent Guillin’s work (2013) is one of the only attempts to analyze RFEs in develop-
ment economics as distinct from randomized controlled trials in medicine. Guillin assesses
the existence of causal capacities within RFEs in development economics and concludes
that RFEs do not yet allow the production of such causal capacities.
4For a study of analogical reasoning, see Achinstein (1964); Bartha, (2010, 2013); Hesse
(1966). For a study of analogical arguments, see Juhte (2005).
5The “replicability crisis” is one illustration of such objections; for an overview of this
crisis, see (Andreoletti & Teira, forthcoming).
6According to Hacking (1988), Charles Sanders Peirce and his assistant were the first
to introduce a random dimension to an experimental design at the end of the 19th century
in order to test low stimuli; see (Peirce & Jastrow, 1885).
7Transporting cholesterol (as well as all fat molecules) around the body is the task
of two lipoproteins: high-density lipoprotein (HDL) and low-density lipoprotein (LDL).
LDL is often labeled as “bad cholesterol” because high levels of this lipoprotein lead to the
deposition of LDL in the arteries, which increases ones risk for cardiovascular events. On
the other hand, HDL is considered “good cholesterol,” because this lipoprotein removes
oxidized cholesterol from the arteries and moves it to the liver, which degrades it.
8Statins are molecules that decrease cholesterol levels. Several kinds of statins are
currently available on the market, such as atorvastatin (sold as Lipitor), fluvastatin (sold
as Lescol), and rosuvastatin (sold as Crestor); I will focus only on rosuvastatin.
9 NGO Pratham was created in 1994 in Mumbai with the support of UNICEF with
the aim of improving primary education in India. http://www.pratham.org/ (accessed 23
July 2015)
10Degree three corresponds to the third year of primary school. The Indian educational
system is based on eight years of primary school and two years of secondary school. The
first five years are devoted to basic education. Students are divided into five degrees, with
degree three corresponding to the first year.
11For the AURORA trial, see Fellstrom et al. (2009); for the ASTROMER trial, see
Chan, Teo, Dumesnil, Ni and Tam (2010); for the METEOR trial, see Crouse et al. (2007);
lastly, for the ASTEROID trial, see Nissen et al.(2006)
12Fisher (1926) first defines these six characteristics: the comparison and the random
dimension (p. 87), the randomized blocks (p. 90), the replication (p. 86), the controlled
aspect (p. 92) and the need for a factorial plan when testing several aspects (pp. 92-93).
18
Fisher (1935) then systematizes these six characteristics in his landmark book The Design
of Experiment.
13A selection bias is present when the treatment is not the only explanation for the
differences between the two groups. Randomization is a unique method enabling the
removal of such a bias; removing such a bias is in fact its primary appeal. For an analysis
of randomization and selection bias, see Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998).
14However, James Heckman and Jeffrey Smith (1995) have showed that instead of re-
moving the selection bias, randomized experiments only balance it between the two groups:
“Randomized social experiments solve the problem of selection bias (...) Finally note that
random assignment does not remove selection bias, but instead balances the bias between
the participant and non-participant samples.” (Heckman and Smith, 1995, pp. 88-89)
Furthermore, Worrall (2010, p. 292) notes “that nothing in the argument shows that the
only way that selection bias can be eliminated is through randomization.”(Emphasis in
the original)
15See Teira (2013) for an analysis of blinding in both RCTs in medicine and RFEs in
the social sciences.
16The size of the samples in our two experiments are similar (each consisting of more
than 15 000 individuals);
17The age of the sample is important: Cardiovascular events usually occur after the age
of 50 for men and after the age of 60 for women (Ridker, 2003; Ridker et al., 2007).
18The terms included no use of hormones, no diabetes, no incidence of cancer in the last
five years of the participant’s life, no history of alcohol or drug abuse, and no inflammatory
conditions
19Most experiments carried out by the J-PAL pay close attention to this aspect; in fact,
Cohen and Dupas’s (2010) experiment on bed nets in Kenya even introduced an incentive
system to ensure that field partners meticulously follow the allocation of the program.
20The results of randomized experiments are the average treatment effects for the treat-
ment group and the average effects for the control group. Thus, the researchers had
no access to the individual distribution. They could distinguish between only a few sub-
populations using the data collected from the experiment. This leads to a major limitation
of this methodology: the heterogeneity treatment effect, which means that, on average,
results may appear positive while in fact harming many individuals in the sample. For a
review of this limitation in medicine, see Baslow, Duran and Kravitz (2004); for a review
in development economics, see Deaton (2010), Barett and Carter (2010), Harrison (2011a),
Ravallion (2009a); and more generally in economics, see Heckman and Smith (1995).
21See Rogers et al., 2014
22For a review of rosuvastatin from the FDA, see Roberts (2009)
23It is worth noting that in medicine, some researchers carry out experiments focusing
only on phase III. My intention here is simply to illustrate the larger frame in which RCTs
are usually embedded.
24For definitions and distinctions between these two concepts, see (Campbell, 1957); for
a precise distinction of the two concepts and its stakes in medicine, see (Rothwell, 2005);
for a precise distinction and the stakes of the two notions within experimental economics,
see (Guala, 2005, 2003, 1999; Guala & Mittone, 2005).
25Nancy Cartwright, for instance, shows that to go from efficacy to effectiveness, ran-
domized experiments should define causal capacities. Therefore, to increase external va-
lidity, randomized experiments should focus on the intrinsic qualities of the intervention
(Cartwright, 1989).
26The Millenium Goals are eight developmental objectives defined by the United Nations
in 2000 that aim to achieve the goals by 2015.
27For a precise presentation of how development programs should be evaluated, see
(Duflo, Glennester, & Kremer, 2007).
28Remedial education is a recent branch of education that targets basic literacy and
numeracy learning.
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29In the seven ways that Kozeracki (2002) emphasizes, tutoring comes in the fifth po-
sition. A prior and explicit reference to this work could have placed Banerjee et al.’s
experiment in the field of remedial education, and thus reinforced the power of their
experiment.
30The idea here is exactly the same as in evidence-based medicine, which aims to inform
medical practices about the results of RCTs. The analogy between such a movement and
J-PAL’s approach is beyond the scope of this paper, but represents, in itself, a fruitful line
of investigation.
31The researchers compared the Balsakhi program to (1) the Pratham CAL program
(Banerjee et al., 2007), which assessed the effects of a computer assistance learning pro-
gram; (2) the Scholarship for Girls program (Kremer, Miguel & Thornton, 2009), which
provided merit-based scholarships for girls to attend primary school; (3) the Teacher Incen-
tives program (Glewwe, Kremer, Moulin & Zitzewitz, 2002), which rewarded teachers; (4)
external monitoring (Duflo & Hanna, 2012), which aimed to reduce teacher absences; and
(5) the Tennessee’s Project Star program, which tested the effect of class size reduction.
32“Whatever the explanation, it seems clear that the current faith in participation as a
panacea for the problems of service delivery is unwarranted. The results seem to depend,
in very complex ways, on the details of the intervention and the contexts. An intervention
designed according to the best practice rules failed to have any impact on the public
education sector in India.” (Banerjee et al., 2010, p. 29)
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